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Abstract: How possible is it for a life of ongoing feeling to hold, given the 
world’s current becomings? Much of this article will consider three of the 
most pervasive of the current disruptions as disruptions of living and 
feeling: climate change, social change, and, in more detail, what I will call 
a ‘third media revolution’. All three of these disruptions (and many others) 
are themselves multiple. They all fold through each other. Living and 
feeling thus find themselves in the midst of catastrophic multiplicity. This 
catastrophic multiplicity haunts much of what’s going on. Questions 
concerning what can be felt within this folding of catastrophes into each 
other are important contemporary questions. Feeling itself—what it is, 
what it does, and what the future of feeling might be—has become both a 
field of struggle, and a complex and open-ended question. A secondary 
set of questions here will concern the future of studies in relation to these 
questions of living and feeling—of Cultural Studies, Media Studies, 
disciplinarity in general, and finally ‘study’, as discussed by Fred Moten 
and Stefano Harney (2013). 
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Relation is not lived absolutely (it would deny itself), it is felt in reality. 
(Édouard Glissant 2010: 17) 
 




On Being Affected1 
 
Despite everything, the questions remain those of life, or better, of feeling 
as the ongoing coming together, or falling apart of life. Yet how possible is 
it for a life of ongoing feeling to hold, given the world’s current 
becomings? Much of this article will consider three of the most pervasive 
of the current disruptions of living and feeling: climate change, social 
change, and, in more detail, what I will call—without any great claim to 
originality—a ‘third media revolution’2. All three of these disruptions (and 
many others) are themselves multiple. They all fold through each other. 
Living and feeling thus find themselves in the midst of catastrophic 
multiplicity.  
 
This catastrophic multiplicity haunts much of what’s going on. It is felt and 
thought with intensity, yet, in that it is not easily accommodated to given 
habits of feeling, remains unfelt and unthought. It is perhaps currently both 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to be part of an SSHRC funded project Immediations that has 
allowed the development of this work. Thanks also to Sarah Cefai for her limitless 
patience and encouragement and to Greg Seigworth and Lone Bertelsen for 
editorial advice. As always, no one else is to blame for the many flaws herein. 
2 For example, see McKenzie Wark’s discussion of ‘third nature’, vectoralist 
capital, abstraction and hacking, from Virtual Geography (1994) to his more recent 
work, and Molecular Red (2015), on new thinking on technology and climate. Just 
some of the other important thinkers here for me are Donna Haraway, Matteo 
Pasquinelli, TizianaTerranova, Luciana Parisi, Jussi Parikka, Massumi, Michel 
Bauwens’ work on P2P culture, Erin Manning, Jennifer Gabrys, Yuk Hui, Ned 
Rossiter, Anna Munster, Adrian Mackenzie, Bodil Marie Stavning Thomsen, 
Alanna Thain, Søren Pold, Geoff Cox, Olga Goriunova, Matthew Fuller, Lisa Parks, 
Wendy Chun, Tung-Hui Hu, Dan Mellamphy and Biswas Mellamphy. Jennifer 
Daryl Slack writes that ‘liberated from the need to he any one thing, 
communication gives us permission to look long and hard at the world in order to 
explore how it works and … propose changes to make it better’ (2006: 223). The 
precursors of the third media revolution would include the cyberneticists as a 
whole, not only Wiener but Bateson, and also the like of Whitehead (see Murphie, 
2017). 
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these, intensely, at the same time—unavoidable and unable to be felt and 
thought with any clarity or adequacy to contemporary events. Questions 
concerning what can be felt within this folding of catastrophes into each 
other, and of how or even whether this can be felt, are therefore some of 
the most important contemporary questions asked of life. It is no wonder 
that feeling itself—what it is, what it does, and what the future of feeling 
might be—has become both a field of struggle, and a complex and open-
ended question. Is our thinking-feeling (Massumi 2008) of feeling itself 
adequate to answering such questions—not only in the academy, but in 
living (not that they are always separate)?  Do our habits of affecting and 
being affected give us, or the world, what is needed? Do these habits allow 
us to take on not only the like of climate change, media change, and social 
change, but also a more general catastrophic multiplicity in which they are 
interwoven? A secondary set of questions here will concern the future of 
studies in relation to these questions of living and feeling. These questions 
concern Cultural Studies, Media Studies, disciplinarity in general, and 
finally ‘study’, as discussed by Fred Moten and Stefano Harney (2013). The 
essay is an attempt at formulating a set of problems rather than solving 
them. 
 
Values, Defensive Propositional Feelings and Thresholds  
 
Questions of value arise quickly within catastrophic multiplicity. The stress 
of catastrophic multiplicity is a fertile ungrounding in which many previous 
social and political problems become repotentialised and mutate. Can the 
values inherent to living survive this? Can the values inherent to living 
even be thought, or felt? Or, to approach this from another angle. do values 
remain the same? As life becomes subject to more intense change, so do 
the values that make life liveable. Value needs to become paradoxical to 
endure. It needs both to hold in a general sense (as in holding living 
together) and to change with change. Furthemore, it needs to do both 
these not only in and through every instance of a life’s actuality, but with 
regard to living’s tendencies and potentials, and each life’s unique 
infinities (Massumi 2017).  
 
Such questions also concern habit’s relation to value. Is it possible to break 
out of the habits of feeling that make a life, when these habits of feeling 
hold it back, stuck in outmoded ways of living? A felt life can be 
destructive. Aspects of value and habits of feeling can constitute 
themselves through fundamental injustices.  Or, from a very different 
perspective, other aspects simply no longer fit what’s going on. What 
kinds of collectivities of feeling more easily go with change, even with a 
catastrophic multiplicity of change, breaking out of the defence of habits of 
feeling, of living? How does one break out of one’s own defence or break 
free of the defences of others to which one is subject, or, commonly, both? 
Some defences often seem to make sense in terms of basic affective 
survival. Yet others are often defences of what seems simply indefensible. 
Indeed the danger in the midst of catastrophic multiplicity is that every 
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kind of defence finds renewed strength at exactly the wrong moment, in a 
kind of catastrophic multiplicity of reactionary feeling. Part of this 
assembles a constellation of defensive propositional feelings 
(propositional feelings being ‘lure[s] to creative emergence in the . . . 
future’ [Whitehead, 1978: 263]). Defence itself becomes proposed as a 
contemporary key to so much of what Alfred North Whitehead called the 
‘lure for feeling’ leading into the future. The assemblage of defensive 
propositional feelings becomes powerful if increasingly phantasmagoric 
and desperate. These feelings propose that certain ways of life are the 
ways of life and must be defended, even and especially against reality 
itself.  
 
The defensive propositional feelings create their own multiplicity, in part 
in a snarl with catastrophic multiplicity. They are always in a complex 
tangle of differential relations: to each other; to happier propositional 
feelings concerning life; to degrees of acquiescence— from the outright 
belligerence toward any alternative, to ironic acceptance (“I know but …”) 
or simply the resigned; and to the micropolitics of multiple real goings on 
in every instance of living3. Many of these destructive propositional 
feelings are well known (although better considered as propositions than 
absolutes, which is not at all to deny their very real effects—the case is the 
opposite). Some of these are found in: the supposed supremacy of white 
life; settler-colonial life; an assumption of life as preferably “neurotypical”4; 
the life laid out for all by the ‘Capitalocene’ (Moore 2015; Haraway 2016); 
patriarchal life; the insistence on normative gender identification and 
heterosexuality, or the insistence on a series of identifications (or 
sometimes non-identifications) of all kinds, often in particular 
combinations; ableism; the peculiar contemporary character of American 
exceptionalism and nationalism in general; a persistent human 
exceptionalism with many variations; and intergenerational inequity. At 
the same time, the compilation of propositions on such a “list” is both 
completely necessary and unsatisfactory. It is necessary because these 
kinds of defensive propositional feelings literally target the series of more 
productive socialities and the affirmative propositional feelings and values 
via which real life is lived by many. For Whitehead a proposition does not 
have to be true to be a lure for feeling and thus to play its part in living, 
thinking and feeling. On the other hand, no matter how important, any list 
                                                        
3 For one thing, as Elizabeth Povinelli notes, ‘Nor do I think that all forms of 
antagonism are equivalent … at the level of socio-material organization and 
process class difference is not equivalent to settler colonial difference is not 
equivalent to gender difference is not equivalent to racialized difference no 
matter that we use the term “difference” in each case’ (Povinelli, Coleman and 
Yusoff, 2016). 
4 As Erin Manning notes, acknowledging that things are different for the 
“neurodiverse”, ‘[d]espite its role as a founding gesture of humanism, of 
individualism, neurotypicality remains for the most part in the background of our 
everyday lives … so we underestimate both its force and its pervasiveness’ (2016: 
3). 
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will be unsatisfactory because it misses the ongoing creativity of what is 
effectively a social machine for destructive propositional feelings—macro 
and micro. There is a constant production of variations within and between 
these defensive propositional feelings, and of many more that lie beyond 
them. It is also true, however, that no list could contain the creativity of a 
more affirmative, ‘minor’ sociality, or the creativity of this sociality’s 
propositional feelings, values and lived life.  
 
This begins to sketch a broad social condition that needs to be considered 
in its entangling with catastrophic multiplicity. This social condition 
involves a series of unresolved tensions between very different values, 
identities or the many variations on the lack or pliability thereof, and 
propositional feelings. It also involves variation within all of this, even and 
especially within and between the supposed non-variables, especially as 
this condition meets the more immanent feeling of power in any given 
situation. The broad condition and its immanent variation are at the heart of 
the machine for defensive propositional feelings, the diverse minor 
socialities of affirmation, and the relations within and between these. All of 
these are actively—if very differently from different “sides”—fuelled by an 
ongoing and again highly creative and adaptable 
normalization/denormalization of increased injustice in which 
propositional feelings play a key role. Any side of this can be strident in 
whatever degree of denial it can muster of catastrophic multiplicity, 
including increasingly obviously ecological catastophe; even as the 
catastrophic easily engulfs whatever such defences or even at times 
affirmative socialities can throw at it. The many permutations of this whole 
constellation are increasingly central to feeling, and to the ongoing 
conversion of general feeling into propositional feelings for defence 
and/or affirmative sociality. How can we create/conserve a life of feeling 
that is more (and less) than the defensive; one that affirms the affirmative, 
draws out ‘the human differential within the general ecology’ (Moten 
2015b5), and does this in the face of contemporary events? What work of 
feeling allows life to emerge once again from what Fred Moten calls simply 
a modernity that ‘is an ecological disaster’ (two of the pillars of which have 
been slavery and settler-colonialism) (2015a)? 
 
Thought carefully across different modes of “life”, all these questions imply 
each other. The issue raised across them all is indeed feeling—in all its 
multiplicity—as the ongoing constitution of life as lived (which I will take as 
provisional definition of feeling for this essay). This is not only a question of 
lives (although these are most certainly at issue). It also concerns each 
instance of collective living—as a complex of lived feeling, in a life’s 
actualities, its tendencies, and its potential. Each collectivity of feeling has 
its own unique attachments to limited infinities of engagement. Each 
collective life is made and made again within its own negotiated 
                                                        
5 Moten is here discussing ‘black social life’ as such a life.  
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avoidances or crossings of thresholds. Brian Massumi writes that these 
thresholds are important to collective, felt life because— 
 
When a threshold is crossed into a new relational field, everything 
re-jigs, what is valued in life changes, life is revalued. Deleuze and 
Guattari say that there is an intuitive collective understanding of 
where the limits are for a given field. Not going past the limits, 
avoiding tumbling over into a new field, is a marker of people’s 
collective, affective investment, their differential attunement, 
towards staying in the relational field they’re in, not because of how 
much they get per se, but because of the life-values, the quality of 
life, that this relational field affords them. (2015b: 138) 
 
Yet neither attunement, nor avoidances, nor crossings are so easy from 
within the contemporary catastrophic multiplicity. Apart from defence, life-
values, established or new, do not so easily take. Feelings—even 
especially strong and perhaps unfamiliar feelings—are in many ways not 
so comfortably felt, if in some circumstances they can be felt at all. Yet 
neither does a comfortable felt life always hold. For one thing, as so much 
valuable work on affect suggests, life now is necessarily lived across lives, 
a felt life of extreme incompossibilities, requiring very different 
attunements across different relational fields (even between reactionary 
and more affirmative life as lived). Thresholds and limits and infinities 
multiply in tension everywhere, to the point that being affected by and 
affecting the world in any easy way seems a nostalgic and impossible 
dream.  
 
In response to this, many social systems become even more reactively 
attuned to neurotypical fantasy (many universities, at least in Australia and 
the UK, are exemplary in this respect and it is in this fantasy that Cultural 
and Media Studies increasingly have to situate their teaching and 
research). An all too common enhanced cultural cognitivism, in many 
guises, is repotentialised in the defence of a normalizing rationality 
(although what is actually the norm of this rationality shifts constantly with 
the one consistency that the advantage usually lands on those in power). A 
rationalisation and systematisation of representations of every kind is 
ongoing (Murphie 2014). Everything that is solid may melt into air in the 
contemporary catastrophic multiplicity, but this air is then sucked down 
and broken down into systematised elements, and organised into a 
relatively lifeless life, via metaphors drawing on 1950s computation (which 
in reality have as uneasy a relation to actual recent computation as as they 
to do to actual brains or minds) (Dupuy 2000). Thinking, the social, social 
and political interests, and even catastrophic multiplicity, are brought into 
a multi-scalar circulation of measure, modulation and adjustment. Feeling 
is only fleetingly acknowledged within these neurotypical systems, 
preferably in a pre-cognitivized form, and certainly not as the ongoing 
constitution of life as lived. Yet the life lived with these systems is 
drenched through and through with what is—systematically at least— 
 8 
largely unacknowledged feeling. Feeling leaks in and out at every point. 
Much of work—by “the system” or by those who must work with it—deals 
with the mismatch involved (DeJours 2007). The farthest reactionary limit of 
this kind of system in terms of life lived is something like the end of 
Kubrick’s Dr Strangelove, which even in 1964 so accurately depicted the 
fate of defensive propositional feelings married to a normalizing 
rationality.  
 
It is impossible not to be involved in some way with the very real cultural 
tangle this produces. Yet repotentialising cultural cognitivism in its 
contemporary mode only gets in the way of a deeper involvement with 
catastrophic multiplicity. One problem here is perhaps that of beginning 
with a badly formed concept of decision—one largely divorced from 
feeling, or in which feeling is reduced to a subsidiary to the larger 
rationalist system (a related problem is that of selection in decision, that 
decision must always choose one path or another—the event-field is lost to 
decision with every selection). Feeling becomes low level reward, a being 
grasped and affirmed by the system. The attempt is to reduce the feeling 
that counts and is counted to the limited thinking-feeling involved in (the 
rapidly fading phantasy of) conscious choice within a simple, pre-
established set of parameters.  
 
Decisions currently being made in response to catastrophic multiplicity 
have very little to do with this, and serve a need to have very little to do 
with this. Cognitivism simply canot grasp what is going on (and “grasp”6 
very precisely describes one way of understanding feeling in process). 
Catastrophic multiplicity not only challenges this limitation and reduction 
of feeling, but raises the much more fundamental question of what feeling 
really is, or could be, and whether different aspects of feeling, thought in 
all its multiplicity, can still feel with each other so that world can hold. 
Catastrophic multiplicity is itself a complex storm of feeling, of aspects of 
world feeling each other in intense, unexpected and constantly mutating 
ways ways. For example, in climate change carbon dioxide emissions can 
be understood as agents of feeling, felt transformatively by the world at 
large, transforming not only the world but what it is to feel in the world in 
many ways (heat, obviously, but also entire felt modes of living, for 
humans or other creatures). Or consider the way that sensors and 
algorithms and data—which I will point out shortly Whitehead called 
‘potentials for feeling’ (1978: 88)—are able to bring together a very 
different world of nonhuman feeling which again transforms what it is to 
feel in the world. The processes of feeling that inhabit these events—
                                                        
6 For Guattari, ‘grasping’ comes from a reading of Whitehead’s ‘concrescence’, 
which is the coming together of what are for Whitehead the basic actual occasions 
of process (see Bains, 2002: 103). Grasping for Guattari is a kind of ongoing 
bringing together that oscillates between embodied ‘finitude’ and incorporeal 
infinitude. Grasping brings together diverse aspects of process (including the 
chaotic, the asignifying, etc). It allows, indeed guarantees, a ‘possible recharging 
with processual complexity’ (Guattari, 1995: 55).  
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human and nonhuman—come together in unexpected ways and fall apart 
in others.  
 
A reconsideration of decision—one that works with or even as feeling in 
the event—might help. Indeed, within life as lived now there is tension 
regarding both decision, and about the field in which decisions are made. 
If this is not a field of smooth process, or at most a dialectical antagonism 
between relatively smooth processes—female/male, science/humanities, 
Hayek/Keynes—then what is this field? There are tensions about the field 
in which decision is to be located: is it within the ‘dimensionless place’ 
critiqued by Glissant (2010:1), or the brain, the body, the nonhuman, or 
social relations? There are tensions as to whether decision is conscious or 
not, and which of these, and to what extent, for whom, and indeed whether 
such a thing as conscious decision even exists. There are ongoing tensions 
about the relation between the thought and/or felt (and who is quite 
literally counted and in what way via the distribution of the thought and the 
felt [Da Silva, 2007]). All of these tensions begin with a split between a 
world, a field, or a system, and individual moments of decision within this. 
To have access to these moments, or to appear to, which might amount to 
the same thing, is to have power in this constellation—both in terms of 
capability and domination. Yet this split between decider and world 
involves what Whitehead called a problematic ‘bifurcation of nature’ 
(between nature apprended—decided—and nature apprehending—
deciding) (Whitehead 1920: 26ff).  
 
There is another way to think decision, however, that provides a way out of 
both cultural cognitivism and the larger problem of the bifurcation of 
nature that underpins it. It also addresses the feeling within decision. It 
begins with the understanding that the field and the decision are not split. 
The field is not a more passive context for more active decisions. Rather, as 
Erin Manning suggests, the decisions that always matter most are those 
decisions in which a field/event itself expresses a ‘decisional force’. This 
force ‘carries the more-than of the anarchic’ (2016: 33) and ‘tweaks’ the 
field/event ‘toward the punctual creation of life-living’ (88). Each world—
small or large—decisions, as this world. Decision in this sense also means 
the gathering of feeling from within a world to make the next world, with its 
new constellation of feeling. Decision in this light is a kind of collective 
differential movement of all the participating movements in events. It is a 
world’s multiplicity in movement (along with this world’s being affected 
and affecting). Manning thus considers movement, which is living and 
feeling in process, as also ‘decisional’, though not ‘volitional’. In all this, 
decision is considered ‘not as external to event but as the cut, in the event, 
through which new ecologies, new fields of relation are crafted’. Manning 
also suggests that even ‘[n]on-conscious movement is decisional in the 
sense that it is capable of altering the course of the event in the event’. 
(2016: 19). Manning calls this “decisioning” an attuning to the event on the 
part of movements within that event. 
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Manning gives the example of the way the movements of dancers and 
athletes (a ‘soccer player’) decision fields/events from within them.  
 
The talent ascribed to the soccer player is ultimately due not to her 
volitional ability to move, but to her capacity to effect cause in the 
event, opening the field to its potential through intuitive realignings 
activated by mobile cues, leading to a (re)directing of the game. (18) 
 
Dealing with catastrophic multiplicity requires exactly this kind of ‘capacity 
to effect cause in the event’. Of course catastrophic multiplicity is not a 
game of soccer. Although, as in soccer, any movement within the events 
involved can also be described as a kind of ‘fielding’ (Manning, 2016). 
Fieldings ‘are before all else a tuning of affective tonality’ (217). Fielding 
and feeling are therefore closely related—the fielding is the field’s attuning 
to felt contrasts or intensities as they move (as feeling). In fielding different 
aspects of feeling can come together into working, felt contrasts—
intensities that hold in the moment (movement of the ball, of players, the 
state of the pitch, wind and rain, changes in muscle tension and breathing; 
extreme weather events intertwined with economic recession and 
algorithmic culture). Fieldings ‘field’ in that the ‘potential of a field cannot 
be understood apart from what it does, from what it can do, in relation to 
the fielding it co-activates’ (119). Manning mentions gravity here as an 
example. The movement of the wind with a forest fire might be another 
example. Or the way that a community forms, in the moment, on the 
streets, or in a protection effort against fossil fuel corporation infrastructure 
such as an oil pipeline. Or the way new concatenations of AI, networks and 
relations of production “decision”. Or the very many fieldings that come 
together in climate change. Manning calls the thinking appropriate to 
fielding ‘choreographic thinking, emphasizing the ability of movement to 
cue and align in spacetimes of composition in ways that open experience 
to new registers’ (19). This provides a way into choreographically thinking 
and feeling catastrophic multiplicity. Yet in catastrophic multiplicity the 
new registers—and challenges for collective life—are somewhat extreme. 
 
It is how to attune to, to move with, and to field and feel the current 
complexity of events, in the midst of catstrophic multiplicities, that are at 
issue here. There are many movements, human and not and in-between, 
that decision together in this sense from within the events of catastophic 
multiplicity. 
 
Climate change and everyday denial 
 
Global levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have now passed 400 
parts per million, climatic records are being broken at an accelerating 
pace, and scientists seem to be constantly discovering more possible 
tipping points and likely nonlinear climate change events. Climate deniers 
and fossil fuel lovers have taken over many governments. We are hurtling 
towards an unliveable world much sooner that we might have thought a 
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few years ago (for some this world has already well and truly arrived). Yet 
despite this, Alice Bell suggests that we remain climate change deniers. By 
this she means that we attune to the fielding of climate change primarily 
through an ‘everyday denial’. We are unwilling to negotiate the thresholds 
involved. 
 
In many ways this everyday denial is understandable. Climate change 
is abstract. We only know about it through vast, complex, global and 
multi-generational networks of interdisciplinary, highly advanced 
science. It’s easy for it to drop out of our minds, even if we believe in it.  
 
On the other hand: 
 
It’s also very scary. A friend who, once upon a time, was the greenest 
person I knew, hugs her infant son tight and tells me softly, slowly: ‘I 
just can’t think about climate change since I had him.’ This feels entirely 
rational to me.  
 
This abstraction7 and scariness is only one of a vast number of ways in 
which climate change comes together in feeling. 
 
Climate change is a catastrophe of feeling. As a catastrophic multiplicity in 
itself and in relation to other catastrophic multiplicities, it is a highly 
complex fielding of events of both human and nonhuman feeling. As such, 
it probably too easily bracketed under a single label (practically speaking, 
in a wiser world we might already have broken the problem up into more 
readily dealt-with problems). In addition to its complexity at any given 
moment, it changes constantly. It differentiates rapidly over time 
(becoming something else), and just as rapidly brings together new 
intensities in integrals of differential relations. The shifting 
differentials/integrals involved act as intensifiers of influence or feeling. 
There is an intensive dissolve between events in the world formally known 
as nature, industry, politics, media and communications, the history of 
many sciences, and, simply, everyday life. This makes [climate change] a 
‘wicked problem’ (Incropera 2015), one in which enhanced feeling breaks 
threholds of every kind (sometimes leading to a paradoxical numbness of 
feeling in humans due to overwhelm, the unfamiliarity of feeling and the 
inability to field such feelings in any coherent way). 
 
Yet as I have begun to suggest, climate change is not the only immense 
change confronting the world. Indeed, there are now multiple ends of the 
world beckoning. There are catastrophes major, such as: literal ends of the 
                                                        
7 Abstraction itself is arguably a general condition of feeling, for example in 
thought as feeling, as ‘thinking-feeling’ (Massumi 2008) across events, as those 
events’ contrasts, or indeed as contrasts/intensities in general. Abstraction has 
specific and shifting constitutions through time—or, time is constituted as an 
abstraction of the foldings of fieldings. 
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world via various means from climate change to the vicious 
triumph/collapse of capital; or the collapse of democracy and rise of micro 
and macro fascisms and neofeudalisms. The are also related catastrophes 
minor (one might be the end of some academic disciplines of which we are 
fond). Indeed there’s a competition between catastrophes at all levels that 
is ripe for the market to exploit (Klein, 2007). And it is exploiting these 
catastrophes (Enclaves anyone? Offsets for your lifestyle? Hedges against 
the decline of coal? Restructure your university with the help of consultants 
perhaps?). Thus rampant exploitation becomes another aspect of 
catastrophic multiplicity. It is certainly tempting to deny much of this, to 
look away and just live your life/do your work, or buy (literally) into the 
marketisation of these multiple ends. There seems a cultural infinity now of 
available defensive propositional feelings (another aspect of 
market/system that exploits these events). It is no wonder that catastrophic 
multiplicity is ‘scary’. It seems pitched against the possibility of thought in 
any regular sense, with destructive modes of life too often decisioning 
current events. All sides of this are complicated by the aspect of 
catastrophic multiplicity that I am calling here “the third media revolution”. 
 
The Third Media Revolution 
 
In 1929, Whitehead suggested that data was ‘potentials for feeling’ (1978: 
88). Among other things, Whitehead was of course a philosopher of 
mathematics, and a key figure in the history of symbolic logic and 
therefore the history of the computing to come. Yet his work of 1929 only 
edges into the material revolution in computing that began in the 1930s. It 
certainly came before the cognitivist developments of the 1950s that 
aligned a notion of computing as symbolic processing with the function of 
the human brain, thought, and psyche (in that order). Perhaps it was this 
earlier moment in history that allowed Whitehead to conceive of the world 
as feeling in process and data as potential for feeling within the ongoing 
process of the world. By data as potential for feeling, Whitehead means 
any kind of data, for example sunlight, or a mood swing. Mathematical or 
computation data are just instances of the general principle. One could 
consider all data as gathering and gathered through a kind of networked 
feeling out, in the grasping and modulation of fields.  
 
The third media revolution pivots on the understanding of data as 
potentials for feeling— feeling here as any kind of fielding or attunement 
within, or grasping and forming of, worlds (this includes emotional life but 
far exceeds it). Like Whitehead, the third media revolution think and works 
with all kinds of data. This includes computational data but also every 
other aspect of world (human and nonhuman) as data. In the third media 
revolution’s generative movements, sensors, computational data and 
algorithms feel out other sensors, computational data and algorithms. Yet 
this is also a feeling or fielding with the world at large. The third media 
revolution has partly cognitivist origins. There is an ongoing sweep of 
cognitivism within it, and it often expresses itself with a cognitivist 
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discourse. Yet the intrusion of the third media revolution into so much 
more of the world than before, and the power of its move far beyond the 
usual domains of media and communications, cannot be understood 
without understanding data as potentials for feeling, and often for feeling 
very differently.  
 
Simply put, the third media revolution is a crossing of thresholds brought 
about by contemporary, pervasive media and communications change. By 
this, I do not mean the way that computing, networking and the like of 
social and mobile media have changed media and communications over 
the past 30 years. Despite the disruption, media and communications have 
until now still felt like the media and communications we more or less 
know. We still make phone calls, write letters (if as texts etc), make images 
and show them to other people, watch films and tv, if in different formats 
and settings, and often via different platforms. Indeed, in some ways much 
of new media take up has involved a significant intensification of old media 
(no doubt in tune with McLuhan’s dictum regarding the content of new 
media being the old).  
 
Much more than this is involved in the third media revolution. Like climate 
change, this seems indeed immense and pervasive, abstract, and 
unfamiliar, not easily attuned with. It is also extensive, affecting life 
profoundly. Yet it is also highly technical and the province of experts. It 
has obvious impacts. Yet much of it is imperceptible. It is also scary. Just 
one aspect of this is that it threatens to change the basis of the economy, 
transforming the relation between labour, capital and production via the 
automation provided by hypernetworks of sensors and more, robotics, 
artificial intelligence and machine learning. It is even more fundamentally 
changing the basis of relations between media, world and modes of living. 
A new multiplicity of powers comes into being between media and world, 
with new fieldings, new feelings, new ways of sensing and grasping 
events, and new decisional forces. These new powers increasingly often 
seem to be by-passing familiar powers, relations and feelings of modes of 
living.  
 
This third media revolution seems to me to be as large as the first two 
media revolutions. All of these overlap a great deal in terms of their 
particular tendencies and developments (and none of them disappear). 
However, they all reach particular thresholds, differently at different times 
and in different places, at which it is possible to point to dramatic change.  
 
A familiar sketch might suggest that the first of these media revolutions 
involved the development of forms of expression more open to abstraction, 
that is, the invention of writing. Writing famously disrupted oral culture, 
changing memory, thinking, communication and the sense of self and 
community in the process. It fostered the keeping of records and accounts, 
and thus capital as possible abstraction from immediate circumstance. In 
all of this and more feeling was reconstituted. The first media revolution 
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also enabled the possibility of a much more extensive first enclosure—that 
of land, or humans for that matter (in slavery), as traded property. The 
second media revolution involved the invention of new forms of 
reproduction and representation, and the distribution of reproduction and 
representations—think the printing press, photography, telegraphy, film, 
and yes, from this perspective, computing (although the latter creates the 
possibility for the third media revolution). As Elizabeth Eisenstein writes of 
the printing press, the second media revolution was an ‘agent of change’ 
(1979). It famously fostered a scientific revolution, democracy, 
colonisation, religious change, the formation of publics and ground-laying 
for the power of nation-states, along with modernity and the 
enlightenment. Again, there is a reconstitution of feeling. The second 
media revolution also enables a second enclosure, that of intellectual 
property. Much of the recent intensification of media and communications 
in so-called “new”, social and mobile media fits here.  
 
It is hard to underestimate the profound nature of world changing 
performed via these first two media revolutions. The third media 
revolution, like the first two, changes general and specific worlds 
dramatically. It requires us to think mediation and communication 
differently. It again reconsitutes the basis of much of fielding and feeling, 
although we do not really completely know how as yet. Media and 
communications become much more obviously entwined with the relational 
fieldings and feelings in which media and world meet and reform. New kinds 
of forces form, along with new kinds of feeling—human and more crucially 
nonhuman (and ‘more than human’ [Manning 2013]). This allows a massive 
intensification of what media and communications do in the world, in part 
via a dramatic increase in the power, reach, and the complexity of auto-
adaptation to worlds of media and communications. At the same time, there 
is an ongoing, in-situ auto-creation of variations on world. More generally, 
the potential for a ‘becoming-environmental’ of power (Massumi 2015a: 23) 
arises because the third media revolution enables a vast increase in both 
the ubiquity and autonomy of media and communications. Everything can 
be felt and relayed. This allows ithe third media revolution to both 
automate and intelligently modulate worlds, not only in connection with 
“us”, but with more aspects of world without us. There is an ongoing 
convolution (or infolding) of signal and signs, of passage and passaged, in 
something like a series of Fourier [signal wave] transforms. This is applied 
to more of the world/life/feeling from within much more of the 
world/life/feeling. This provides what are simultaneously dramatic 
extensions and diminutions of ‘human’ powers, along with an uneven 
extension of ‘non-human’ powers. The result is often a local diminution of 
powers for many individual communities and modes of living. In sum, the 
third media revolution involves a new and much larger series of collisions 
between media and worlds (in every sense of the word “world”, macro or 
micro). Thus it enables a ‘third enclosure’, which is simply put that of 
everything that has not already been enclosed (Murphie 2011).  
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The third media revolution has two very different accents. At best these 
form a productive contrast that makes possible a deeper engagement with 
the transitions required by catastrophic multiplicity. Yet this is not always 
the case. At worst, the contrast threatens both human and nonhuman 
worlds. On the one hand, as mentioned above, the third media revolution 
involves a ‘becoming-environmental’ of power. Media and 
communications enable much of this, often in collision with existing or 
alternative worlds. Part of this is a literal extension of media and 
communications into more of the environment. Yet this has subtler 
elements in which life, worlds and fieldings/feeling are fine-tuned to 
power. Massumi suggests that in ‘the ecology of powers’ the becoming-
environmental of power involves ‘over-all, environmental control (the 
power to modulate emergence immanently to the field of life)’ (2015a: 
235). It deals in ‘preemptive control’ (200). ‘Rather than empirically 
manipulate an object (of which it actually has none), it modulates felt 
qualities infusing a life-environment’ (200). The becoming-environmental 
of power, that— 
 
… returns to life’s unlivable conditions of emergence in order to 
bring life back, redirecting its incipience to alter-emergent effect, is 
an ontopower. Ontopowers rejoin naturing nature’s force of 
emergence, in order to ride it out, and even hijack it. (41)  
  
This is an active parasitical hijacking of worlds. In media and 
communications terms, think drones or the internet of things, or artificial 
intelligence or data analytics’ colonisation, pre-emption, or even 
outmoding of human thinking-feeling.  
 
All this challenges the other accent of the third media revolution, which 
involves a changing concept of world itself, and thus of thinking, feeling, 
communication and much else. In this accent the third media revolution 
speaks of (and listens to) a world already and always in process, always 
already ‘a medium’ for the ‘vector transmission of influences’, or simply the 
movement of feeling (Whitehead 1978: 286; see also Murphie 2017). 
Wolves are found to have dialects when howling. Plants have many means 
of communication, feeling and sociality, including via networks of mycelia 
(fungus threads) under the ground. More than this, every event, as world 
in process, involves the transmission and gathering of influences or 
feelings via the world as medium. This is the more “ecological” voice of the 
third media revolution. It gives expression to the possibility of a more 
careful revolution in thinking-feeling. Think Bateson’s ecology of mind as 
siding with the world as medium taken as more positive ecological 
affirmation. Although this is complicated by the fact that Bateson’s ecology 
of mind is also part of the cybernetic realisation, the general abstraction of 
complex feedback as fielding. This ecological realisation also makes the 
becoming-environmental of power more thinkable, the more felt as 
tendency, and therefore possible.  
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The technical elements of the third media revolution, which is thresholding 
now, are numerous. They evolve quickly8. They diverge as much as they 
converge. Key now are artificial intelligence and machine learning, bots 
and the general automation of skill and expertise of all kinds (including for 
example the use of bots in political communication). AI itself now fields, 
feels and “decisions” in its own co-extensive attunements within financial, 
business and work or other fields. Then there are voice and facial 
recognition (and functional automated responses to the like of voice 
control, gesture or monitored body movement), and automatic translation. 
An example is machine learning discovering and analysing the wolf 
dialects mentioned above. Another is the kind of language processing 
found in Amazon’s digital assistant Alexa that scientists currently claim is 
allowing some form of communication with body cells. All this colonises 
and undermines the basics of communication. There are also the internet of 
things, drone networks, and other forms of hypernetworking extending out 
into the world (the climate science research networks, from to lab to 
computer modeling, are an early example—Paul N. Edwards [2011] calls 
this a ‘vast machine’). There are robotics and the general automation of 
physical processes, usually in league with other forms of automation and 
usually enabled by networked communicational environments of some 
kind. Again, automation in the third media revolution means 
nonhuman/more than human (Manning 2013) “decisioning”, or “fielding” 
from within an event. It is also more than human in that what we call 
“automation” in this sense is both a logical extension from and an eventual 
substitute for the more reductive and basic forms of automation found in 
the simpler bureaucratic control of human work, living, thinking and 
feeling (discussed as cultural cogitivism earlier). The intensifying of this in 
much of management for many years—and here university management 
can be exemplary—is in many ways a precursor to the third media 
revolution. Another aspect of the third media revolution includes virtual, 
augmented and mixed realities, holograms and new sensate access to the 
previously imperceptible. These involve a general augmentation and 
transformation of sensation and perception. Recently it was claimed for 
example that quantum computing allows magnetic resonance imaging of 
chemical reactions at the level of atoms—in real-time. Then there are 
highly developed forms of surveillance/sousveillance which transform the 
constitution of feeling as public/private, and challenge given 
understandings of the “I” and the “we”. There are electronic and 
algorithm-based finance, including high frequency trading, blockchain 
and cryptocurrency (and the more general alt-finance and alt-economics 
                                                        
8 One simple way to think the third media revolution is that it often involves that 
which is not easily analysed via the like of “multi-modal analysis”, as much of it 
flips rather quickly and incessantly between the intensely amodal, and the 
differentially/integrally shifting/combining of modalities (not to mention 
inventing new modalities, as momentary as these might sometimes be). Many 
established forms of media and communications (and cultural) analysis, premised 
on the first or second media revolutions, are inadequate to the third media 
revolution.  
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movements with the potential to redesign important bases of the social). 
There are not only “big” but generative re-fieldings of data (the latter is 
simply data as active, moving, dynamic, constantly 
differentiating/integrating itself). These produce an algorithmic culture, 
and the like of predictive technics (for example, in “pre-crime” but also of 
course in the like of climate change planning). From moment to moment, 
algorithms seem increasingly able to gauge a number of fine tuned, 
shifting “states” of fielding/feeling, of almost any kind, and auto-adjust-
respond to these (from emotions to basic physical changes in the body or 
collections of bodies, with ramifications for health and medicine, law and 
governance and much else). There are 3D printing, genetics and the 
convergence of DNA and media, and the general ability to physically 
produce reality differently, in multi-scalar and dramatically transformative 
terms. There is quantum computing that recreates computation itself, 
qualitatively as well as in terms of pure speed and volume of calculations. 
Finally, the way that energy grids are becoming “smart”, not only via 
smart meters but via smart grids that decentralise power, is a way that 
energy is also part of the third media revolution9.  
 
Although there are many individual examples of the third media revolution 
it is also necessary to see it as a complex field(ing) that interweaves other 
field(ing)s. Again, this transforms feeling. At the heart of these fieldings 
are complex multipliers and modulations of signal—taken broadly as the 
transmission of influence or feeling—with constant inversions and 
convolutions of form and content, of signal and sign, of carriage and 
carried, all of this extending into world and into other immense changes 
such as climate and social change. All this gives obvious potential for 
catastrophe. Finally, the third media revolution, in its collisions of world 
and media, requires a movement way beyond the traditional province of 
Media and Communication Studies, or a more traditional Cultural Studies. 
Media and Communications Studies expand into every field of research, 
although this questions the discipline as currently formed. The third media 
revolution’s ambition—and its emerging reality—is to become a part of all 
aspects of world(s), and therefore part of the province of all established 
disciplines. Established disciplines are therefore left reflecting what are in 
danger of becoming outmoded constellations of fielding/feeling (although 
in some cases these outmoded constellations might need protection). This 
in effect questions disciplinarity itself.  
 
In sum, the third media revolution makes pervasive, complex claims on 
everyday life, claims that are perhaps, in affective, life-terms, as large as 
those of climate change. Briohny Doyle’s novel The Island will Sink (2016) 
gives a good account of the combined disruption. The characters are 
caught up in a hyper-networked world that can supplement memory 
almost to the point of replacing it. Always networked, any and all 
experience is recorded and modulated. Most responses to the world 
                                                        
9 Jeremy Rifkin he calls this a “third industrial revolution” (2011). 
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involve a kind of extreme soft control. Children are so immersed in VR and 
data networks that any disruption is felt as extreme anxiety (the only time 
some become emotionally connected to their parents). On the other hand, 
extreme weather events disrupt all this media entanglement, and the 
ongoing climate disruption in the like of sea-level rise is constant. This 
becomes the subject of forms of obsessive and extreme simulations of the 
experience of fielding catastrophic multiplicity. The main character is a 
famous immersive director, and specialises in catastrophes, usually 




The third series of pervasive changes that contribute to catastrophic 
multiplicity to be considered here are social changes. Although there is 
only the space to sketch what is in any case well known. Once again, the 
point is that much of this is scary, abstract, and calls for new powers to be 
affected and affect, in itself, and the more so in combination with the other 
changes I have described here. Consider both the actualities and, more 
importantly, the tendencies, the feeling out towards the future, moving 
through the concurrence of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump and 
the general failure of the democratic political process. Alongside this 
though are many exciting new forms of collaboration and cooperation 
(Iceland’s crowdsourcing of its constitution, P2P culture, the Transition 
movement). So there are forms of democracy collapsing at larger levels 
but also emerging differently at more local levels. Democracy is now like 
some weird series of particles coming and going in the Hadron collider. 
There are also what is truly a multiplicity of resistances to what are 
intensifications of injustice. Here there is the like of ongoing social 
movements that are mattering, such as Black Lives Matter, the 
Revolutionary Love movement, or the many occasions globally in which 
indigenous people are organising front line resistance to fossil fuel based 
Capital, as in the Native American nations that gathered at Standing Rock 
against the Dakota Access Pipeline, a protection event directed against 
both environmental and cultural destruction. There is also of course the 
increase of structural and specific violence in increased racism, misogyny, 
homo and transphobia. This is not to mention intolerance of anything not 
conforming to the not so much invisible as dead hand of contemporary 
fossil fuel and property-based Capital. On the other hand, as McKenzie 
Wark asks, what if this doesn’t any more involve Capital as we’ve thought 
of it up to now? What if it’s something worse (2017)? The hegemonic side of 
this often involves increasingly well organised (and often legislated) forms 
of gaming the system and what is effectively legalised corruption, fraud 
and extortion, within institutions, corporations and governments. This not 
only allows, but materially supports and provisions attacks on certain lives, 
and indeed certain entire modes of life. This in turn has allowed the recent 
series of political moves towards even more extreme 
governmental/corporate authoritarianism in the US, Europe, Australia, 
Brazil (and elsewhere).  
 19 
 
As is well known, a series of well-documented shifts in the global balance 
of economic powers (thus also shifts in the layers of singular economies) 
underlies this series of social shocks. More than this, however, there is a 
shift in the very nature of economy. Many such economic shifts involve the 
crossing of various media/world collision thresholds in for example the 
way that networked global communications enable transformations in 
trade and work. These now become entwined with the emerging economic 
shifts produced by climate change and the challenges of moving from 
fossil fuels to renewable energy. It is hard to find powers that allow one to 
be affected by all this without life falling apart, let alone powers to affect it.  
 
Speculation on a Fourth Industrial Revolution 
 
One way (though not the only way) to describe the way that social change, 
the third media revolution and even at times climate change come together 
is in terms of what even The Guardian newspaper is calling the ‘fourth 
industrial revolution’10.  
 
The First Industrial Revolution used water and steam power to 
mechanize production. The Second used electric power to create 
mass production. The Third used electronics and information 
technology to automate production. Now a Fourth Industrial 
Revolution is building on the Third, the digital revolution that has 
been occurring since the middle of the last century. It is 
characterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines 
between the physical, digital, and biological spheres. (Schwab, 
2016) 
 
The fourth industrial revolution indicates a threshold in which the industrial 
bases of the social (now extending through world and life) are caught 
somewhat ambiguously between different if entwined kinds of power. 
Matteo Pasquinelli describes these variously as ‘carbosilicon assemblages 
and cyberfossil capital’11 (2016) and ‘Augmented Intelligence trauma’. He 
writes of the latter:  
 
One day, it will not be arbitrary to reframe twentieth century thought 
and its intelligent machines as a quest for the positive definition of 
error, abnormality, trauma, and catastrophe—a set of concepts that 
                                                        
10 See https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/series/fourth-
industrial-revolution 
11 ‘Energy and Information … bifurcated out of the industrial machine of the 
19th century … They initiated and extended two technological lineages 
or machinic phyla: … the one of energy as a medium of motion and the one of 
energy as a medium of control and communication, the paradigm of ecology and 
the one of cybernetics. The two regimes carried of course different energetic 
costs and also quite different colonial costs ...’ (Pasquinelli 2016) 
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need to be understood in their cognitive, technological and political 
composition … (2015: 7) 
 
Arguably that day is already here. 
 
The agony felt (or in some ways unable to be felt in any manageable way) 
now involves Capital (or ‘something worse’12) reorganising through both 
climate change, the third media revolution, and the fourth industrial 
revolution, even as these intrude further and in more refined ways into 
world, into us and the very consitution of “us”—whether self or social, into 
the fielding and feeling of life, and of course into the culture that is the 
domain in which Cultural Studies moves. 
 
As I have begun to suggest above, the reorganisation of labour is a large 
part of this. As Tim Dunlop writes, aside ‘from climate change, this 
reinvention of work is the most wicked problem facing humanity, and we 
can see the unease it causes reflected in the politics surrounding Brexit, 
and of Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn and Pauline Hanson’ 
(Dunlop 2016). Dunlop suggests this will involve an entire restructuring of 
the economy and culture (and via this of life, of feeling). The example that 
provokes Dunlop here is Amazon Go, amazon’s new material stores in 
which machine learning, computer vision and AI allow the stores to know 
(literally to feel out, to grasp) exactly who is shopping and what they pull 
off the shelves (and of course, via networks, link into their bank accounts). 
Thus consumers can just grab things and go—with no cashiers (Amazon 
2016). As Jordan Pearson points out, what is at stake here is not just the 
efficiency of job cuts. More than this, Amazon wants to build a ‘a closed-
loop system of integrated consumer surveillance’ which ‘comes down to 
knowing you’ (2016). Even more than surveilling and ‘knowing you’, 
however, Amazon Go is bringing behaviours, thoughts, and feelings into 
these loops. It’s about control of the very power to affect and be affected—
in the becoming-environmental of power. 
 
A short speculation on the tendencies that could take this into the future is 
possible. When I told a friend about this on Facebook, she was somewhat 
dismayed. I joked, ‘don’t worry, all the people you see in Amazon’s 
demonstration video are really robots, not humans’. Yet then it hit me. Why 
wouldn’t Capital replace people with AI/robotic networks of simulated 
consumers, by-passing the need for human consumers as well as workers? 
My hopefully only speculative reading of the way this is tending is as 
follows. Imagine indeed replacing the customers with robots spiced up 
with perhaps even “bespoke” AI to vary their responses. This would 
revolutionise Friedrich Hayek’s sensory order, and revivify what is today 
his faltering (mis)interpretation of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” as the 
basis for an economic order of the market. It would fulfil differently the 
collective sensory order of thinking-feeling, needed for the supposed 
                                                        
12 See also Murphie 2014. 
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optimal functioning of the “invisible hand”. In short, it would by-pass the 
human in market processes. Indeed, this has been beginning to happen for 
some time in other areas. For example, there is dividualised data (that, 
synthetic data, made to serve the needs of the system and removed from 
the actual life of the individual). Another example is the way in which 
people have become much less significant in much network-based hi-
frequency financial trading. A particularly telling third example is found in 
AI now writing its own software (including further AI software), and its own 
cryptography. There is also an ‘AI-run hedge fund’ that ‘has created a 
cryptocurrency for its human data’ (Faiffe, 2017). Meanwhile, the ‘world’s 
largest hedge fund is building an algorithmic model from its employees’ 
brains’ (Copeland and Hope, 2016). It is not enough therefore to think 
about bureaucrats and experts, as well as shop assistants, being replaced 
by basic interface design, robots, or AI. More is happening. It is true that 
the Amazon Go store as it is now forms a bridge to the use of much more 
fine tuned data with which to enclose the very micro-modes of life, the 
networked fielding/feeling out of the consumers’ fielding/feeling. But this 
in turn might be the basis for a second bridge. This bridge would lead to a 
world in which the like of AI replaces the human consumer, in fact, most 
humans or aspects of the human. It is perhaps necessary then to consider 
AI and robotics as a potential basis for an entirely simulated market, with 
simulated labour, simulated consumption, simulated Capital, or perhaps 
even simulated ‘something worse than Capital’. Baudrillard was right. All 
this of course runs on simulated feeling, which is no less real for that 
(Baudrillard was less right about the unreality of simulation). All this would 
be the ultimate dream of the .01%. Total control of every aspect of a 
simulated economy would fund a way into retreats into protected enclaves, 
trying to escape the dangers of climate change and other aspects of 
catastrophic multiplicity.   
 
This has implications for education, and for research, for fields and 
disciplines, for what these fields and disciplines cover, and for how they 
cover it, and indeed for the fundamental forms of organisation via which all 
this happens. Shall we, for example, have an unfortunate choice between 
something like an “Amazon Go” education increasingly removed from the 
province of the human. Learning and other analytics would allow AI to 
tailor automated learning experiences for those learning, draw from a 
database of alterable lecture fragments, exercises and tests and at the 
same time pull these experiences and their potentials into the closed loops 
of certain educational or part-educational conglomerates (perhaps Amazon 
itself, or a merger of Amazon and Pearson, the education conglomerate 
currently edging itself into all aspects of education, including AI based 
education, from testing to curriculum, from school to tertiary education). 
Or perhaps education would become a matter, via extended machine 
learning, of machines learning from machines, of data learning from data, 
and networks learning among themselves? What will humans do?  
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Such a remaking of labour, consumption and more would also be a 
reorganising of what passes for “life”, and for whom. It would reorganise 
much of feeling as the basis for life. Its possibility brings up urgent 
political-cultural questions that are however too easy displaced towards a 
disposition against other forms of life in the worst kinds of prejudice and 
violence. 
 
Data and Feeling 
 
As I suggested above, throughout all this data can be understood as 
potentials for feeling. Working with data is therefore a matter of feeling. 
Moreover, every event, every move in this creates more data as potential 
for further feeling. A proliferation of data, at an increasingly number of 
scales, necessarily implies a proliferation of potentials for feeling. Looked 
at from this angle, catastrophic multiplicity is a massive and pervasive 
proliferation of data, and thus of potentials for feeling. What will fielding 
and feeling become when extreme and rapid change leads to greater 
excesses of potentials for feeling—machine feeling, human feeling, animal 
feeling and plant feeling, and more, and in-between all these? What will 
the relation be between all the different intelligences and the many kinds 
of feeling that are at the moving heart of these intelligences? What will it 
be to be affected by others or the world, or to affect others or the world? 
What indeed will words such as “others” and “world”, “I” and “we” mean? 
What does this tell us about feeling in general? 
 
Not only is there an obligation to imagine much about feeling and living 
differently, there is an urgent necessity to do so, once we have looked the 
situation in the non-face (while it looks into our faces more and more). 
  
Non/Post/Para/Infra-Institutionalities, and “Studies” 
 
This is all now the stuff of Media Studies and Cultural Studies and more in 
the academy, or it should be. Yet institutionality of all kinds is threatened 
by such events (by economic and climatic disruption, social and political 
change, and not least by the third media revolution). Will there still be 
anything resembling universities in five to ten years time, let alone 
established fields such as Media and Cultural Studies (and every other 
kind of Studies)? At the same time, questioning institutionality in the light of 
catastrophic multiplicity reminds us that we do not yet know what Media 
and Cultural Studies (or other Studies, or any other institutionality) can do, 
or could become. More generally, we do not know13 everything there is to 
know about what thinking with affect can do, despite the great deal of fine 
work done in the area.  
 
One useful way to think more freely about such questions—even and 
especially under the duress of the times—lies in engaging more with what 
                                                        
13 Here I echo one of Erin Manning’s useful refrains. 
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Moten and Harney call ‘study’ (2013: 58ff). Indeed, something like study in 
this sense seems the lifeblood of engaged intellectual life and of the 
protection of valuable social life now. 
 
… study is what you do with other people. It’s talking and walking 
around with other people, working, dancing, suffering, some 
irreducible convergence of all three, held under the name of 
speculative practice. (Moten and Harney, 2013: 110)   
 
Study moves with fielding and feeling differently, without the calls to order 
(125) that disciplinarity and institutional “legitimation” bring with them. Yet 
in doing so, study allows engagement with more important questions—felt 
questions, lived questions, questions in the midst of change— than 
institutional legitimation allows. Study challenges the becoming-
environmental of power. Study is also fluid in its relations to non/post/para 
or what we might call infra-institutional practice. The feeling/fielding of 
study can involve any of these, from a simple departure from institutions to 
infra-inhabitation of them. The latter—‘infra’—means inhabiting given 
conditions with a feeling that re-conditions the life involved from within. It 
is a purposefully restricted use of Massumi’s use of ‘infra’ (to describe 
affect as ‘the infra-conditioning of every determinate activity’14). Yet study 
does not need to belong to institutionality. It does not need not to belong. It 
can inhabit it, or not, or both. It is more concerned with thinking-feeling 
and in the end has more in common with an active engagement with 
fiction, film, and music, along with ‘walking … dancing’, in so far as these 
are an active part of social life (all of these seem to me to be better at 
dealing with the current catastrophic multiplicity than much of the 
academy). In this it opens up the way that affect or feeling in general can 
belong to the orders of the times, or not, or both. Study does not need to 
involve a total refit of the world. It can just as easily involve something 
approaching Manning’s ‘minor gesture’, ‘claiming not space as such, but 
space-of-variation’ (Manning, 2016: 2). As Moten says about the classroom 
[although this applies to so many other situations]: 
 
… let’s just see what happens if I don’t make that gesture of calling 
the class to order – just that little moment in which my tone of voice 
turns and becomes slightly more authoritative so that everyone will 
know that class has begun. What if I just say, ‘well, we’re here. Here 
we are now.’ (126) 
 
Here is a simple tactic—or a propositional feeling—to forego, in situ, 
destructive propositional feelings that take the form of calls to order. 
Instead, in study—despite if still sometimes within institutionality—we find 
                                                        
14 ‘Affect is the infra-conditioning of every determinate activity, including that of 
language. The preferred prefix for affect is ‘infra-’. ‘Pre-’ connotes time sequence. 
But affect always accompa- nies, on the parallel track of potential’ (2015b: 212).  
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that we do not know where things might go, or what even institutionality 
could become, if only for a moment.  
 
We also find once again that we do not really know, in absolute or finished 
terms, what feeling itself is doing, within the like of climate change, the 
third media revolution or social change, and even and especially as we 
find ourselves new collectivities (human and not) of affecting and being 
affected. We find, as Glissant writes, that ‘Relation is not lived absolutely (it 
would deny itself), it is felt in reality’ (2010: 17). We do not know what 
feeling could become in the future. We could never absolutely know. 
Feeling, as process, is both the becoming of the future and of feeling itself. 
Thus we do not know what life could become, or what the potentials there 
are even within catastrophic multiplicity for life. Regarding institutions, this 
means there is a more urgent series of questions involved than the 
perennials—what should Cultural Studies be, and how should it be 
delimited, or what, for that matter, should affect theory be or 
include/exclude? The latter are the traditional disciplinary questions, 
asked just as much by the interdisciplinary (because it has less institutional 
traction and therefore must constantly constitute itself). If it’s now a time 
when it’s “all hands on deck” (or in fact on quite a few decks at the same 
time), then perhaps study provides a beginning for the work involved. It 
needs to happen undetermined by calls to order, unburdened by fear of 
the loss of the given institutional object (Berlant 2016), and in rejection of 
the lure for feeling of institutional traction. It certainly needs to abandon 
defensive propositional feelings, especially when these only exacerbate 
injustice. There are so many things to let go of in order to enable work with 
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